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Purpose – How is liquidity formed in emerging financial markets? Do traders preannounce 
their orders to attract outside liquidity providers (a practice referred to as sunshine trading)? 
This paper studies liquidity formation of infrequently traded stocks. It also investigates the 
role of preopening periods in the formation of liquidity. 
Design/methodology/approach – We focus on the 8 largest stocks traded on the West 
African Bourse in 2000. Our data set includes all the orders submitted to the market from 
January 3rd, to December 13th, including their time of placement, limit price, and proposed 
quantity, and the identity of the broker-dealers who submitted them. We analyze order 
placement strategies as well as preopening price efficiency and broker-dealers’ profits. 
Findings – The evidence is consistent with broker-dealers engaging in sunshine trading. First, 
large orders are placed early during the preopening period and are not cancelled. Second, for 
most of the stocks in our sample, preopening prices reveal information long before trading 
actually occurs. Third, large volumes are traded without significant price movements. Fourth, 
the most active brokers’ profits are lower than less significant intermediaries’ ones, indicating 
that the former do not manipulate the market. 
Practical implications – The analysis suggests that the actual liquidity on the West African 
Bourse is higher than what is indicated by the average state of the order book. This might 
increase the attractiveness of African stock markets for global portfolio managers. 
Originality/value – To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this paper is the first to 
empirically study sunshine trading as theoretically analyzed by Admati and Pfleiderer (1991). 
 
Keywords Sunshine trading, Liquidity formation, African stock markets, Preopening period, 
Infrequently traded assets, Market microstructure 




Infrequent trading is a widespread feature of stock markets. Easley et al. (1996) note 
that “on organized exchanges, many (if not most) listed stocks trade infrequently”, and use the 
New York Stock Exchange and the London Stock Exchange as illustrations. Khwaja and 
Mian (2004) point at the same phenomenon in emerging markets. They indicate that, in 
Pakistan, Hungary, Portugal, Ireland, and Iceland, the 5 most traded stocks comprise around 
70% of the turnover, implying that the trading activity of the remaining stocks is very limited. 
Infrequent trading is even more pronounced in African stock markets where, according to 
Kenny and Moss (1998), the turnover in Sub-Saharan countries did not exceed 10% of the 
capitalization in 1995. 
In this context, understanding liquidity formation is crucial both for market designers 
who would like to promote trading, and for traders whose profits largely depend on execution 
quality. Two market imperfections are known to impede liquidity: costly market participation 
(see Grossman and Miller, 1988) and asymmetric information (see Glosten and Milgrom, 
1985). However, some trading arrangements and market organizations can mitigate the impact 
of these two factors. Admati and Pfleiferer (1991) show that a strategy such as sunshine 
trading whereby traders preannounce their orders can enhance liquidity by improving the 
coordination between demand and supply of liquidity. Dia and Pouget (2010) further 
demonstrate how a preopening period coupled with a long-term relationship among market 
participants can constitute an effective and credible way to implement sunshine trading. To 
our knowledge, the present paper is the first to empirically study these issues. 
Our investigation uses data from the West African Bourse. This stock market 
represents an ideal venue to empirically identify sunshine trading. First, the West African 
Bourse includes a preopening period. Second, participation in the West African Bourse is 
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likely to be costly for international investors who are the major liquidity providers in African 
stock markets. If they were to participate in this market (and thus provide liquidity), these 
global portfolio managers would have to learn about the macroeconomic conditions prevailing 
in West Africa, and about the uncertainty surrounding a particular stock. This information 
gathering process is likely to be quite costly, in terms of time and research effort, in a 
developing economy with relatively poor information availability. This cost of market 
participation is reinforced by the fact that the West African Bourse is not included in global 
indexes such as the MSCI World Index or the IFC Global Emerging Markets Index. To the 
extent that portfolio managers are evaluated and compensated with respect to these 
benchmarks, this creates an additional opportunity cost of trading in West Africa. Third, only 
a small number of broker-dealers can submit orders to the market and these orders are not 
anonymous. The West African Bourse thus offers an ideal venue for the development of the 
long-term relationships necessary for the credibility of sunshine trading. Fourth, the West 
African Bourse includes a preopening period before the daily call market. During this 
preopening period, tentative prices and volumes are computed but no transaction occurs. This 
preopening period is transparent: tentative prices and volumes are publicly disseminated 
among market participants. Such a preopening period thus offers a mechanism through which 
market participants can communicate to others their willingness to trade. 
Our empirical results can be summarized as follows: i) some large orders are placed 
early during the preopening period and are not cancelled, ii) for most of the stocks, tentative 
prices reveal information long before trading actually occurs, and iii) large volumes are 
transacted without significant price movements. Consistently with the theoretical models cited 
above, we argue that market participants implement sunshine trading to enhance market 
liquidity and welfare. One could argue that the long-term relationships among market 
participants, if they could sustain sunshine trading, could also allow these agents to collude 
 5
and manipulate prices in their advantage. Indeed, Khwaja and Mian (2004) argue that the 
legal and institutional environment in emerging markets is not always able to protect outside 
investors, and show that in the Karachi Stock Exchange brokers did collude to manipulate 
prices. Our results differ from theirs. We find that the broker-dealers who are the most active 
cannot be identified as informed agents. i We thus conclude that they are not manipulating 
prices or, if they do, that they do not profit from this manipulation.  
Our paper is related to the empirical literature on liquidity and price formation. Biais, 
Hillion, and Spatt (1995) study the formation process of the order book in the Paris Bourse. 
Lehmann and Modest (1994) investigate liquidity provision in the Tokyo Stock Exchange. De 
Jong, Nijman, and Roell (1995), Chan and Lakonishok (1997), and Bessembinder (2002) 
focus on the measurement of transaction costs in various market mechanisms. Biais, Hillion, 
and Spatt (1999), and Cao, Ghysels, and Hatheway (2000) study price formation during 
preopening periods in stock markets. The impact of communication through non-binding 
quotes on price discovery has also been investigated by Aggarwal and Conroy (2000), for 
initial public offerings, and by Peiers (1997), for foreign exchange markets. Price discovery 
during trading periods has been the focus of numerous studies including Stoll and Whaley 
(1990), Amihud and Mendelson (1991), and Madhavan and Panchapagesan (2000). Our work 
complements these papers by underlining the role of preopening periods in the liquidity 
formation process. 
Our paper has implications for global portfolio management. It suggests that liquidity 
on the West African Bourse is higher than what is suggested by the average state of the order 
book. Indeed the practice of sunshine trading appears to enable traders with high liquidity 
needs to attract liquidity providers. Our results indicate that there is a latent liquidity that is 
not reflected in the order book because of the market participation cost, and that is realized 
only when traders engage in sunshine trading. This implies that transaction costs on the West 
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African Bourse are overestimated when measured in terms of time-series averages (see for 
example the measure based on the average depth of the order book developed by Kehr, 
Krahnen, and Theissen, 2001). This indicates that portfolio managers willing to trade on the 
Bourse might make better deals than what is suggested by the average trading activity. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the West African Bourse and 
our data. Liquidity and price formation are documented in Section 3 and 4, respectively. 
Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Description of the Market and of the Data 
2.1. Structure of the West African Bourse 
Based in Abidjan, the West African Bourse was launched in September 1998. ii It can 
accommodate listing of companies originating from the various countries of the West African 
Economic and Monetary Union (Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest-Africaine). In 2000, 
40 stocks were traded on the market. 39 were from Ivory Coast and 1 from Senegal. The West 
African Bourse is an electronic order market. Orders can be placed by sixteen broker-dealers 
via computers located at the Bourse offices or at the brokerage houses themselves. Only these 
sixteen agents can place orders. iii The West African Bourse operates three times a week on 
Monday, Wednesday and Friday. iv It is organized as a preopening period followed by a call 
market. During the preopening period, from 8:30 am to 10:30 am, broker-dealers can place 
limit orders that can be freely cancelled or revised. Each time an order is entered in the 
system, an indicative market-clearing price is computed and announced to the broker-dealers. 
Furthermore, these broker-dealers can observe the entire order book, i.e. the characteristics of 
the orders, the identity of the broker-dealer who placed the orders, and whether or not they 
trade for their own account. At 10:30, the orders present in the book are used to build the 
aggregate supply and demand curves. The transaction price is the price that maximizes trading 
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volume. v Buying (selling) orders with a limit price greater (smaller) than or equal to the 
market-clearing price are executed. Rationing occurs when there is an order imbalance at the 
market-clearing price. Orders are executed proportionally to their proposed quantity. There is 
no time priority. If supply and demand do not cross, another trading session is organized on 
the same day which is similar to the previous one. A preopening period occurs from 11:00 to 
11:30 (the orders present in the book at 10:30 are still valid for this new session). The orders 
are potentially filled at 11:30 using the same procedure as before. 
2.2. The Data 
Our data set includes all the orders submitted to the market from January 3rd, 2000 to 
December 13th, 2000. This corresponds to 141 trading sessions. We have all the 
characteristics of the orders including their time of placement, their limit price, the quantity 
proposed, and the identity of the broker-dealers who placed the orders. However, we do not 
know whether broker-dealers act as principals or as agents. For each session, we computed 
the indicative prices, the market clearing price, and the quantities allocated to each broker-
dealer. 
Among the 40 stocks listed on the Bourse, we focus on the stocks that were included 
in the index of the Bourse. The index included 10 stocks at the end of 2000. Among these 10 
stocks, only three remained in the index throughout the year. We complemented our data set 
by choosing five additional stocks that remained in the index at least 2 quarters during the 
year 2000. 
2.3. Summary Statistics 
Market Activity - For each stock, Table 1 reports several descriptive statistics for the year 
2000 including the average and standard deviation of the volume per trading session, the 
average number of orders per trading sessions, and the turnover defined as the total number of 
shares traded over the number of outstanding shares. 
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The volume per trading session, and the number of orders submitted to the market are 
on average quite low. These phenomena are reflected in a very low turnover. The market thus 
appears rather inactive. This is confirmed by the large number of trading sessions without 
trades. Interestingly, despite the apparent low liquidity, the transaction volume is quite 
volatile. This suggests that, from time to time, the market experiences shocks on the demand 
and/or on the supply of shares. This high trading volume volatility despite the low average 
volume suggests that the West African Bourse is punctually able to accommodate large 
transactions. The extent of orders cancellations and modifications appears limited: overall, 
only 2% of the orders are cancelled, and only 7% are modified. 
Broker-dealers’ Activity - Table 1 indicates that the number of broker-dealers active on the 
market is low. Between two and seven broker-dealers (out of sixteen) intervene on the market. 
This means that all the broker-dealers are not providing liquidity at every trading session. 
Following Ellis, Michaely, and O’Hara (2000), to assess the competitiveness of the Bourse, 
we computed for each stock the average Herfindahl index across the sessions with a non-null 
trading volume. For a given trading session, the index is equal to the sum of the squares of the 
market share of each broker-dealer. The market share of a broker-dealer is computed as the 
ratio of the number of shares traded by the broker-dealer over the transaction volume. An 
index of one corresponds to a monopolistic situation while an index of 1/n, n being the 
number of active broker-dealers, corresponds to a situation where every broker-dealer handles 
the same volume. Table 1 shows that the Bourse is an oligopoly market. This result echoes the 
findings of Ellis, Michaely, and O’Hara (2000) who draw similar conclusions for the 
NASDAQ market, and in particular for low volume stocks. Table 2 complements these 
results. It presents the broker-dealers’ activity in terms of order placement and shares traded 
averaged across stocks and trading sessions. Table 2 shows that 8 broker-dealers account for 
99% of the transaction volume and that the 4 largest broker-dealers alone account for 89% of 
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this volume. The Bourse thus appears as a concentrated trading venue where a few agents are 
making the market. 
Transaction Costs - Table 3 presents a measure of transaction costs for the various stocks 
under study. This measure was constructed following Kehr, Krahnen, and Theissen (1998). 
For each trading session, we added one buying market order in the order book, and computed 
the new transaction price (Pb). After canceling this buying order, we added one selling market 
order, and computed another transaction price (Ps). Transaction costs were measured by the 
following formula: 
*P
PP sb   where P* was the actual transaction price. We computed this 
measure by adding orders of various sizes: one, ten, a hundred, two hundred, five hundred, 
and one thousand. For each stock, we computed the average transaction cost across trading 
sessions where the additional buy or sell orders could find a counterpart. The number of 
trading sessions in which the order book was not thick enough to allow execution of the 
additional orders is also provided. These trading sessions may be viewed as infinitely illiquid. 
Table 3 suggests that average transaction costs are high on the West African Bourse. They 
represent from 2.6% to 16.4% of the transaction price for a one hundred-share order with an 
average equal to 6.8% for the 8 stocks we consider. Compared to the findings of Kehr, 
Krahnen, and Theissen (1998) concerning the opening call in Frankfurt, these transaction cost 
appear rather large. Moreover, there is a lot of trading sessions, from 26 up to 130 sessions 
depending on the stock considered, in which it was not even possible to add one-share orders 
and still find counterparts. This might again be a sign of extremely poor liquidity on the 
Bourse. However, such a low liquidity is in some sense at odds with the fact that high 
volumes are observed on particular days. In fact, we shall argue that this measure consistently 
overestimates transaction cost since it only considers submitted orders and not latent orders. 
In the context of an emerging market, the bias can be important because of the cost associated 
with market participation. 
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3. Liquidity formation 
This section studies the liquidity formation process in the West African Bourse. The 
summary statistics presented above suggest that the trading activity is on average quite low 
and volatile. The volatility of the returns is also low. To complement these points, Figure 1 
shows the number of shares traded on the market along with the transaction price over the 141 
trading days in our sample. Panels A trough H correspond to the 8 stocks under study sorted 
alphabetically. For all the stocks, the trading volume appears highly volatile while the prices 
are surprisingly stable. These features indicate that the market is punctually able to 
accommodate huge transactions without major price adjustments. 
Building on these graphical impressions, we perform the following regressions. For 
each stock, we regress the absolute returns from the last trading sessions (a measure of the 














t represents the time expressed in terms of trading sessions with a non-null trading volume. tP  
is the transaction price in CFA francs, and tQ  is the trading volume in shares at time t. The 
results are in Table 4. 
For the 8 stocks, the coefficient b appears not significantly different from zero. 
Further, the regression R²s are extremely low. For the 8 stocks, we cannot reject the 
hypothesis that trading volume has no impact on prices, and in particular that high volumes 
does not destabilize prices. This may appear counterintuitive, as one would expect a thin 
market to generate high execution costs. This is however consistent with Dia and Pouget 
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(2010)’s model where liquidity flows to the market only when it is needed thanks to sunshine 
trading going on during the preopening period. Our subsequent empirical investigations aim at 
capturing the extent to which traders implement sunshine trading on the West African Bourse. 
To preannounce their liquidity needs, investors should place orders early during the 
preopening period. In particular, to the extent that large liquidity needs primarily require 
preannouncement, large orders should be observed early during the preopening. Then, in 
order to constitute credible announcements, these orders should not be cancelled before the 
call. Finally, if sunshine trading is successful on the Bourse, a significant part of the orders 
placed early should be eventually executed. Tables 5 and 6 address these issues. vi To 
construct these tables, we classify the orders according to two dimensions: their size and their 
time of placement during the preopening period. Each dimension is divided in four quartiles. 
This creates a 16-cell table. The upper-left cell includes the orders pertaining to the fourth 
quartile in terms of size, and to the first quartile in terms of placement time. This cell thus 
includes the (relatively) large orders that are placed (relatively) early during the preopening 
period. Table 5 presents the average proportion of orders of various sizes placed during the 
four intervals of the preopening period.vii The first quartile of placement time is on average 
9:16 am. The second quartile of placement time is on average 9:39 am. The third quartile of 
placement time is on average 10:07 am. The first quartile of order size is on average 9 shares. 
The second quartile of order size is on average 32 shares. The third quartile of order size is on 
average 92 shares. Since sunshine trading is more likely to occur when large quantities have 
to be traded, our analysis will focus on large orders, i.e. orders pertaining to the 4th and 3rd 
size quartiles. 
From Table 5, we can compute the proportion of large orders placed in the first part of 
the preopening period (before the median placement time). These proportions are 50% and 
56% for the 4th and 3rd size quartiles respectively. This means that large orders are quite often 
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placed early during the preopening period. To verify that such large orders do not only reflect 
market manipulation, Table 6 reports the proportion of orders executed in each category. It 
indicates for each order size and each placement time the proportion of orders that have been 
(partially) filled at the time of the call. From Table 6, we observe that 28% of the large orders 
placed early (4th and 3rd size quartiles, and 1st and 2nd time quartiles) are on average executed. 
This indicates that a substantial part of these orders is “in the market”. Figure 2 illustrates 
these findings. It shows that large orders are uniformly distributed over time and that a 
substantial part of the orders placed in the first part of the preopening period end up executed. 
These results may appear surprising if one believes that traders have an incentive to 
refrain from placing orders as long as these orders cannot be executed. Indeed, insiders may 
be willing to conceal their information as long as possible. Uninformed traders may be willing 
to wait to gather as much information as possible. On the contrary, the theoretical results on 
sunshine trading suggest that traders may have an interest to preannounce their liquidity needs 
in order to attract potential liquidity providers. This is consistent with our empirical results. 
These results complement the empirical findings of Biais, Hillion and Spatt (1999) concerning 
the Paris Bourse. Note that, in the West African Bourse, an intense activity occurs well before 
the time of the call. On average, the median placement time is 9:39 am meaning that half of 
the orders are already placed more than 50 minutes before transactions occur. In contrast, the 
major part of the order placement in the Paris Bourse occurs during the last 30 minutes of the 
preopening period. 
As a robustness check and to give an idea of the number of shares attached to the large 
orders we focus on, Tables 7 and 8 reproduce the analysis displayed in Tables 5 and 7 
respectively.viii It appears that the large orders (4th and 3rd size quartiles) represent 97% of the 
quantities that are proposed on the market. These orders are thus of high economic importance 
in the context of the West African Bourse. From Table 7, we obtain that 38% and 57% (for 
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the 4th and 3rd size quartiles respectively) of the total quantity proposed via large orders are 
offered in the first part of the preopening period (before the median placement time). 
Furthermore, Table 8 indicates that on average 28% of the quantity proposed via large orders 
placed early (4th and 3rd size quartiles, and 1st and 2nd time quartiles) is eventually exchanged 
at the time of the call. These results confirm the previous results obtained with orders. They 
indicate that when broker-dealers want to exchange large quantities of shares, they place large 
orders early during the preopening period, orders that are often executed during the call. At 
the beginning of this section, we showed that large traded quantities seem not to incur high 
execution costs. Our interpretation is that broker-dealers engage in sunshine trading to attract 
potential liquidity providers. The very low average trading volume in the West African 
Bourse suggests that, without sunshine trading, it would be very difficult to trade such large 
quantities of shares. 
Admati and Pfleiderer (1991) suggest that, for the sunshine trading to be effective, the 
preannouncement should be credible in the sense that agents engaging in sunshine trading 
should eventually trade the quantities they preannounced. The fairly low number of order 
cancellations or modifications indicates that offers made during the preopening period can 
indeed be considered as firm. 
 
4. Price Formation 
This section studies the price formation process in the West African Bourse. When 
they place orders, broker-dealers have to post limit prices.ix Over the course of the preopening 
period, these orders are crossed and their limit prices translate into indicative prices. These 
indicative prices are publicly available. If traders engage in sunshine trading, we expect 
indicative prices during the preopening period to be related to call prices. It is clear that 
toward the end of the preopening period, tentative prices converge toward the call price: the 
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call price per construction equals the last indicative price. However, Dia and Pouget (2010)’s 
model suggests that, when traders implement sunshine trading, indicative prices computed 
early during the preopening period should also be related to the actual call price. Admati and 
Pfleiderer (1991) state that agents have to trade the quantities they preannounced. Extending 
this argument, their theoretical analysis shows that, when implementing sunshine trading with 
limit orders, agents should choose to preannounce prices at which they stand ready to trade. 
This implies a link between the early tentative prices and the transaction price. 
To study this issue, we compute the average indicative price before and after the 
median placement time. We then regress the return from the previous trading session to the 
call onto the return from the previous trading session to the preopening period. For each stock, 


























where 1tIP  represents the average indicative price during the first part of the preopening 
period. The results are in Table 9. 
Indicative prices computed and announced during the first part of the preopening 
period are indeed related to the call price for 7 out of 8 stocks. This means that, by looking at 
early indicative prices, broker-dealers can have a pretty good idea of the price that will prevail 
on the market. This is consistent with our model where the limit price quoted by the insider 
during the preopening period equals the price he quotes at the trading stage. 
Given that no transaction occurs during the preopening period, the informational 
content of indicative prices in terms of fundamental valuation could be questioned. In the 
context of sunshine trading, this issue becomes crucial since preannouncers are big 
participants and may try to manipulate market prices. On the other hand, the model cited 
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above shows that information revelation during the preopening period might be beneficial to 
the traders since it relaxes the participation constraint of the outsider. 
To address this issue, we follow Biais, Hillion, and Spatt (1999) and study whether the 
return between the previous trading session and the next trading session can be predicted by 
the return between the previous trading session and the preopening period. For each stock, we 

























To obtain a measure of the total information that could have been revealed during the 
preopening period, we also ran these regressions with the call price tP  instead of the mean 


















The results are in Tables 10 and 11. Table 10 indicates that, for some stocks, early 
indicative prices incorporate information. This is supported by the fact that 1  is statistically 
significant 5 times out of 8 at the 10% error level (4 times out of 8 at the 5% error level). 
Using data from Tables 10 and 11, the amount of information revealed in the first part of the 
preopening period can be measure by the ratio between the R² of the regression using the 
average indicative price during the first part of the preopening period and the R² of the 
regression using the call price. Across the 8 stocks, 44% of the information is on average 
revealed during the first part of the preopening period, i.e. long before trading takes place. 
However indicative prices during the preopening period do not reflect all the information that 
is incorporated in the call price. This can be seen from the fact that 1  is overall smaller than 
1, or from the fact that the R² in Table 10 are in general smaller than the R² in Table 11. This 
could leave room to insiders’ profit. In the context of sunshine trading, the agents cannot 
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afford to profit from insiders’ profits without suffering from future denial of liquidity 
provision. Large broker-dealers who implement sunshine trading are thus less likely to be 
identified as insiders. This is contrary to what one would expect if the large broker-dealers 
were colluding to manipulate prices. 
To examine this issue, we looked at whether broker-dealers’ positions could predict 
the future evolution of securities’ prices. For each stock and each broker-dealer, we regressed 
the future returns (from the current trading session to the next) onto the signed quantity traded 








 where tq  is the signed quantity (positive for a purchase, and negative for a sale) traded by the 
broker-dealer. A broker-dealer is identified as insider as soon as the regression coefficient is 
positive and statistically significant at the 10% error level. Table 12 reports the number of 
times each broker-dealer has been identified as insider across the 8 stocks in our sample. 
Overall, very few broker-dealers have been identified as insiders. This indicates that 
the adverse selection risk on the market is fairly low. This may appear surprising in an 
emerging market but can be explained by the fact that information is revealed during the 
preopening period. Furthermore, the broker-dealers identified as insiders are not the major 
broker-dealers of the marketplace. This finding reinforces the conclusions of the previous 
section. These major broker-dealers are indeed the ones susceptible to engage in sunshine 
trading, and are thus the ones who may suffer from future liquidity denials. If they engage in 
sunshine trading, it seems reasonable to think that they do not attempt to mislead their trading 
partners. On the other hand, the small broker-dealers that do not receive liquidity shocks 
because they do not deal much with outside investors can afford to profit from private 
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information if they have some. Altogether, these results suggest that broker-dealers in the 
West African Bourse did not manipulated prices in their advantage. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper empirically studies sunshine trading in financial markets. Using data from 
the West African Bourse, we show that: i) part of the large orders are placed early during the 
preopening period and are not cancelled, ii) for some stocks, tentative prices reveal 
information long before trading actually occurs, and iii) large volumes are transacted without 
significant price movements. Consistently with Admati and Pfleiderer (1991) and with Dia 
and Pouget (2010), market participants appear to implement sunshine trading strategies in 
order to enhance market liquidity. 
This paper has implications for global portfolio management. It suggests that the 
liquidity on the West African Bourse is higher than what is indicated by the average state of 
the order book. Indeed the practice of sunshine trading appears to enable traders with high 
liquidity needs to attract liquidity providers only when these liquidity needs are realized. 
There is a latent liquidity that is not reflected in the order book because of the cost of market 
participation, and that appears only when traders engage in sunshine trading. 
This paper also shows that the preopening period may play an important informational 
role and enhance welfare. Market organizers may thus have an interest in providing traders 
with pre-trade communication platforms such as preopening periods as a way mean to 
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Table 1 – Trading activity 
This table presents various measures of trading activity for the 8 stocks under study. The average and the 
standard deviation of the trading volume, and the average number of orders are computed over the 141 trading 
sessions in 2000. The turnover is defined as the total number of shares traded over the number of outstanding 
shares for the year 2000. The average and the standard deviation of the number of active broker-dealers are 
computed across the trading sessions with a non-null order placement. The average Herfindahl index and the 
average 1/number of broker-dealers are computed across the trading sessions with a non-null trading volume. 
BICC stands for Banque Internationale pour le Commerce et l’Industrie de Côte d’Ivoire. BLHC stands for 
Blohorn – Côte d’Ivoire. CIEC stands for Compagnie Ivoirienne d’Electricité. PALC stands for Palm – Côte 
d’Ivoire. SGBC stands for Société Générale de Banques en Côte d’Ivoire. SHEC stands for Shell – Côte 
d’Ivoire. SNTS stands for Société Nationale de Télécommunication. NA stands for “Not Available”. 
 
 
BICC BLHC CIEC PALC SGBC SHEC SNTS STBC
Average Volume 246 88 100 141 116 71 1719 73
Standard Deviation of the Volume 772 253 168 378 494 170 7211 295
Turnover 0.0231 NA 0.0050 0.0050 0.0053 0.0139 0.0242 NA
Number of Trading Sessions without Trades 54 38 24 73 105 33 3 57
Average Number of Orders 10 9 16 13 8 8 31 11
Proportion of Cancelled Orders (in %) 1.41 2.86 3.27 1.00 1.25 3.19 2.95 1.08
Proportion of Modified Orders (in %) 4.44 11.45 9.95 5.79 4.83 8.38 5.55 9.32
Average Number of Active Broker-Dealers 2.21 3.49 4.52 4.67 2.76 3.72 7.35 3.48
Standard Deviation of the 
Number of Active Broker-Dealers 0.98 1.44 1.44 1.54 1.05 1.47 0.26 1.77
Average Herfindahl Index 0.81 0.54 0.49 0.57 0.81 0.49 0.52 0.58
Average 1/number of broker-dealers 0.56 0.35 0.25 0.25 0.44 0.32 0.20 0.41  
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Table 2 – Broker-dealers’ activity 
This table presents the number of orders placed and the number of shares traded by each broker-dealer, averaged 
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Table 3 – Transaction costs 
The measure of transaction costs we used is inspired by Kehr, Krahnen, and Theissen (1998). For each trading 
session, we added one buying market order in the orderbook, and computed the new transaction price (Pb). After 
canceling this buying order, we added one selling market order, and computed another transaction price (Ps). 
Transaction costs were measured by the following formula: 
*P
PP sb   where P* was the actual transaction price. 
We computed this measure with orders of various sizes: one, ten, hundred, two hundred, five hundred, one 
thousand. For each stock, we computed the average transaction cost across trading sessions where the additional 
buy and sell orders could find a counterpart. The number of trading sessions (out of 141) in which the orderbook 





BICC BLHC CIEC PALC SGBC SHEC SNTS STBC
Transaction cost for the trading of 1 additional share 5.0 3.8 2.5 9.2 3.3 1.9 1.7 3.3
Number of trading sessions without liquidity 99 84 66 84 130 65 26 92
Transaction cost for the trading of 10 additional shares 5.3 12.5 5.3 9.7 4.3 2.4 1.9 3.9
Number of trading sessions without liquidity 104 114 106 90 132 80 29 100
Transaction cost for the trading of 100 additional shares 6.2 16.4 5.2 10.9 3.9 3.6 2.6 5.6
Number of trading sessions without liquidity 122 121 134 96 135 108 64 129
Transaction cost for the trading of 200 additional shares 6.7 26.0 3.73 14.6 3.3 2.6 3.0 3.1
Number of trading sessions without liquidity 127 133 140 102 138 120 77 133
Transaction cost for the trading of 500 additional shares 10.0 59.5 * 16.7 3.3 4.5 4.0 3.9
Number of trading sessions without liquidity 134 139 141 113 138 130 95 138
Transaction cost for the trading of 1000 additional shares 16.4 * * 22.7 5 4.8 5.6 *
Number of trading sessions without liquidity 138 141 141 126 139 135 105 141
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Table 4 – Regression of the instantaneous price volatility onto the trading volume 
This table presents the results of OLS regressions of the absolute returns onto the trading volume. The return at 
date t is computed as the difference between the price at date t and the price at date t-1, divided by the price at 
date t-1. Only the days with a non-null trading volume are considered. The number of observations is 





Intercept a Coefficient b R² Observations
BICC 0.0041 -0.0000 0.00 87
(0.15) (0.78)
BLHC 0.0027 0.0000 0.02 103
(0.00) (0.21)
CIEC 0.0143 0.0000 0.00 117
(0.00) (0.74)
PALC 0.0131 -0.0000 0.00 68
(0.00) (0.79)
SGBC 0.0346 -0.0000 0.06 36
(0.00) (0.16)
SHEC 0.0052 -0.0000 0.00 108
(0.00) (0.64)
SNTS 0.0064 -0.0000 0.00 138
(0.00) (0.87)
STBC 0.0076 0.0000 0.02 84
(0.00) (0.23)
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Table 5 – Distribution of orders according to their size and their time of placement 
during the preopening period 
For each of the 8 stocks, orders are classified in sixteen categories according to the placement time quartile and 
the size quartile they belong to. Table 5 averages these data. The upper-left cell of the table represents the large 
orders placed early. The first quartile of placement time is on average 9:16 am. The second quartile of placement 
time is on average 9:39 am. The third quartile of placement time is on average 10:07 am. The first quartile of 
order size is on average 9 shares. The second quartile of order size is on average 32 shares. The third quartile of 








Table 6 – Proportion of orders executed at the call as a function of their size and 
placement time during the preopening period 
For each size and time category, this table reports the proportion of orders (partially) filled at the time of the call, 





1st Quartile 2nd Quartile 3rd Quartile 4th Quartile average
Order Size 4th Quartile 25% 24% 35% 58% 36%
3rd Quartile 32% 32% 36% 58% 39%
2nd Quartile 37% 37% 41% 58% 43%
1st Quartile 34% 34% 43% 53% 41%
average 32% 32% 39% 57% 40%
Time of Placement
1st Quartile 2nd Quartile 3rd Quartile 4th Quartile sum
Order Size 4th Quartile 6% 7% 6% 6% 25%
3rd Quartile 7% 7% 5% 5% 24%
2nd Quartile 7% 7% 6% 5% 25%
1st Quartile 6% 5% 7% 8% 26%
sum 25% 25% 25% 25% 100%
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Table 7 – Distribution of proposed quantities over the sixteen categories of orders 
This table reports the proportion of the total quantity that has been proposed by each type of orders, averaged 








Table 8 – Proportion of the executed quantities proposed by each type of orders that are 
eventually executed 
For each category, this table reports the proportion of quantities that have been exchanged at the time of the call, 





1st Quartile 2nd Quartile 3rd Quartile 4th Quartile sum
Order Size 4th Quartile 17% 18% 23% 33% 91%
3rd Quartile 2% 2% 1% 2% 6%
2nd Quartile 1% 1% 1% 0% 2%
1st Quartile 0% 0% 0% 0% 1%
sum 19% 21% 25% 35% 100%
Time of Placement
1st Quartile 2nd Quartile 3rd Quartile 4th Quartile average
Order Size 4th Quartile 25% 24% 35% 58% 36%
3rd Quartile 32% 32% 36% 58% 39%
2nd Quartile 37% 37% 41% 58% 43%
1st Quartile 34% 34% 43% 53% 41%
average 32% 32% 39% 57% 40%
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Table 9 – Price discovery regressions 
This table presents the result of OLS regression of the returns from the previous trading session to the call onto 
the returns from the previous trading session to the first part of the preopening period. The return at date t is 
computed as the difference between the price at date t and the price at date t-1, divided by the price at date t-1. 
Only the days with a non-null trading volume are considered. The number of observations is consequently not 
the same for all the stocks. The data is conditional on the existence of indicative prices in the first part of the 







Intercept A 1 Coefficient B 1 R² Observations
BICC 0 1 1.00 20
BLHC -0,0011 0.0148 0.00 45
(0.18) (0.74)
CIEC -0.0019 0.2395 0.12 62
(0.55) (0.00)
PALC -0.0049 0.7353 0.71 10
(0.62) (0.00)
SGBC -0.0608 0.3233 0.41 8
(0.04) (0.08)
SHEC -0.0013 0.5451 0.25 54
(0.23) (0.00)
SNTS 0.0001 0.4446 0.44 69
(0.91) (0.00)
STBC -0.0012 0.8993 0.41 26
(0.47) (0.00)
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Table 10 – Information revealed by indicative prices 
This table presents the result of OLS regression of the returns from the previous trading session to the next 
trading session onto the returns from the previous trading session to the first part of the preopening period. The 
return at date t is computed as the difference between the price at date t and the price at date t-1, divided by the 
price at date t-1. Only the days with a non-null trading volume are considered. The number of observations is 
consequently not the same for all the stocks. The data is conditional on the existence of indicative prices in the 







Intercept alpha 1 Coefficient beta 1 R² Observations
BICC 0.0052 0.9736 0.79 20
(0.33) (0.00)
BLHC -0.0021 0.0234 0.00 45
(0.09) (0.73)
CIEC -0.0036 0.1362 0.01 62
(0.53) (0.36)
PALC -0.0175 0.4496 0.45 10
(0.13) (0.03)
SGBC -0.0680 0.5485 0.44 8
(0.10) (0.07)
SHEC -0.0026 -0.0154 0.00 54
(0.07) (0.93)
SNTS 0.0001 0.4871 0.33 69
(0.97) (0.00)
STBC -0.0012 0.8795 0.27 26
(0.59) (0.01)
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Table 11 – Information incorporated in transaction prices 
This table presents the result of OLS regression of the returns from the previous trading session to the next 
trading session onto the returns from the previous trading session to the current trading session. The return at 
date t is computed as the difference between the price at date t and the price at date t-1, divided by the price at 
date t-1. Only the days with a non-null trading volume are considered. The number of observations is 
consequently not the same for all the stocks. The data is conditional on the existence of indicative prices in the 






Intercept alpha Coefficient beta R² Observations
BICC -0.0052 0.9736 0.79 20
(0.33) (0.00)
BLHC -0.0011 0.8329 0.31 45
(0.28) (0.00)
CIEC -0.0029 1.2653 0.56 62
(0.44) (0.00)
PALC -0.0141 0.5556 0.52 10
(0.17) (0.01)
SGBC 0.0297 1.4906 0.83 8
(0.10) (0.00)
SHEC -0.0026 0.3374 0.09 54
(0.05) (0.03)
SNTS -0.0008 0.8296 0.42 69
(0.60) (0.00)
STBC -0.0001 1.1069 0.85 26
(0.95) (0.00)
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Table 12 – Identification of insiders 
 
This table reports the number stocks out of the 8 stocks in our sample for which a broker-dealer has been 
identified as insider. To identify insiders, for each stock and each broker-dealer, we regressed the future return at 
date t onto the signed position taken by the broker-dealer at date t. A broker-dealer will be considered as an 
insider if it has a positive coefficient with a p-value smaller than or equal to 10%. The future return at date t is 
computed as the difference between the price at date t+1 and the price at date t, divided by the price at date t. 
Only the days with a non-null trading volume are considered. 
























 Figure 1 – Volume and Price over the 141 trading sessions in our sample 
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Figure 1 (continued) – Volume and Price over the 141 trading sessions in our sample 
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Figure 2 – Large orders during the preopening period 
This figure represents the distribution of large orders (i.e. orders pertaining to the 4th and 3rd size quartiles) over 
the four time quartiles of the preopening period. It also indicates the amount of orders executed in each time 












1st Time Quartile 2nd Time Quartile 3rd Time Quartile 4th Time Quartile
proportion of orders executed proportion of the large orders placed in the various time quartiles
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Notes 
                                                          
i This can come either from the fact that they do not possess private information or, as argued 
in Dia and Pouget (2010), from the fact that they reveal most of their information during the 
preopening period in order to reduce the adverse selection costs borne by the liquidity 
providers. 
ii The West African Bourse is also called the Bourse Régionale des Valeurs Mobilières or 
BRVM. It succeeded to the Abidjan Stock market, which was created in 1979. 
iii In 2002, a new broker-dealer has been authorized by the Bourse. 
iv Since the end of 2001, the Bourse is open daily. 
v If there are several volume-maximizing prices, other criteria are applied until only one price 
remains. These criteria consist in choosing the price that i) minimizes excess demand, and ii) 
minimizes variation between successive prices. If several prices still satisfy these constraints, 
the transaction price is the highest of these prices. 
vi We have not analyzed order cancellations and modifications since only a fairly small 
fraction (overall 9%) of the orders is affected by such operations (see the summary statistics). 
We rather study the order book after cancellations and modifications occurred. 
vii Columns and rows do not always add up to 25% of the total number of orders. This 
happens when several observations fall on the limit between two quartiles. In this case, they 
were classified in the lower quartile. 
viii Table 8 does not take into account potential rationing. 
ix Market orders are prohibited on the Bourse. 
